Introduction
In Australia as in many other countries, much of public policy concerned with reducing poverty and welfare dependence has focused on promoting individuals' attachment to the labour force. In the last decade, welfare programs have been altered to reduce negative work incentives for those at the bottom of the income distribution.
For families with children, the cost of nonparental childcare has been treated as crucial in the decision of parents to engage in market work and policy reforms have included substantial increases in the subsidization of childcare services. Such policy shifts overseas sparked many studies of the relationship between labour supply and nonparental childcare use. However, to date there has been no formal study of this relationship for Australia.
In this paper, we use a specialised survey on childcare use to estimate demands for formal and informal childcare by households. A bivariate Tobit model is used to allow for interdependence between the two forms of childcare and to model specifically the prevalence of zero hours of childcare. Childcare costs are imputed from these and incorporated in a flexible discrete choice model of household labour supply. The labour supply model is structural and incorporates the details of income taxes and social security payments. Simulations are then performed to look at labour supply responses to changes in the price and costs of childcare for various types of households.
Although there has been no direct estimation of the labour supply effects of childcare costs in Australia, some studies have addressed related issues. One of the earlier policy thrusts by state and federal governments consisted in ensuring the provision of sufficient childcare places to meet demand and this issue has received some attention (e.g. Teal, 1992; Szukalska et al., 1999) . Others have been concerned with the imputation and estimation of the costs of childcare using various methodologies. 1 Although there are some disagreements, results mostly suggest that costs of childcare are large and hence should influence the parents' decision to work. It was also suggested that the childcare policies in place in the mid to late nineties did not provide incentives to low-wage mothers with young children to participate in the labour 2 market. Finally, Cobb-Clark et al. (2000) present direct evidence from non-working partnered mothers who report that childcare problems are not the main factor determining their decision not to participate in the labour market.
Turning to the overseas literature, an important aspect of childcare is the large degree of heterogeneity across types of care. There is considerable usage of both informal services provided by relatives, often at no monetary charge, and of highly structured, formal day care centres offering large variations in quality and in fees. Availability of services differs by age of child and region, and often in ways that are unobserved by the researcher (for example access to cost-free care by relatives or friends.) The existing research has mainly dealt with formal care. Blau and Hagy (1998) , Robins (2002, 2000) and Michalopoulos et al. (1992) are some of the few studies that model jointly the employment decision and the choice of mode of childcare. In these latter studies, the mode of childcare and the labour supply are discrete choices. Our study is more general in the modelling of the intensity of childcare use since we model formal and informal hours of care as continuous.
However, using a bivariate Tobit imposes fairly strong restrictions at the zero hours' choice.
A related difficulty is the modelling of the price. Self-reported prices are likely to be endogenous as parents choose among providers offering different levels of quality and other attributes (usually unobserved) along with differing price structures.
2 Generally the endogeneity in prices for formal care has been addressed by using some of the available variables as instruments for price variations or by merging information from other sources. Robins (1988, 1989) use regional variations in expenditures to measure price and quality changes. Kimmel (1998), Robins (2002, 2000) , and Ribar (1992 Ribar ( , 1995 use regional variations in childcare regulations and/or wage levels; Blau and Robins (1988) and Leibowitz, Klerman and Waite (1992) impute information on wages of childcare workers by state; while Duncan, Paull and Taylor (2001a, b) match information on availability of services by local authority.
Other researchers combine information from household surveys and surveys of care 4 information on income, labour market experience, personal and household characteristics and is often used for labour supply estimation in Australia. The most recent year for which we have both the CCS and the SIHC is 1996.
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The 1996 CCS contains information on 11,419 children under 12 living in 6,421 income units. Unlike most of the data sets used overseas, the CCS includes information on childcare for all households regardless of their employment status.
Children are grouped in income units and total childcare (across all children in the income unit) is used. All empirical work is conducted separately for lone parents and couples. Table 1 presents information on childcare use by households according to the employment status of the parents and the age of the youngest child. Approximately 60% of households use childcare services. This proportion is larger for households with working parents: 81% of employed lone parents and 69% of two-worker households use childcare. This proportion rises further when children under 5 are present: nearly all working lone parents and over 80% of working couples use childcare. Among couples, 40% of total childcare hours are in formal arrangements while for lone parents, the proportion is just over 30%. Based on the classification used in the survey, informal childcare includes relative and non-relative care while formal childcare includes: before and after school care, long day care, family day care, occasional care, preschool, and other formal care arrangements. The treatment of preschool care is discussed later in the paper. The proportion of formal-care hours is not overly sensitive to the employment status of parents but it depends strongly on the age of the children in the household.
Interestingly, most households in the survey state that they are not constrained in their hours of childcare use. Only 9% of the households state that they require additional childcare but find it is unavailable. (This does not include parents who say they are constrained because of high childcare prices.) 5 Until recently no Australian data set provided both information on childcare use and the variables necessary to estimate labour supply functions. The new Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey will provide an alternative source of information. However, HILDA is more restrictive in the details available on childcare. This is expected to improve in later waves. Finally, Table 3 presents information on the different reasons for childcare use. Work is listed as a main reason (for at least one child in the household) for 42% of the 6 It is likely that these hourly costs incorporate some of the government subsidies paid for childcare. This is another reason why prices will vary by households. See the end of this section for more details.
6 households who use formal care and 47% of the households who use informal care.
For 62% of children aged 3 to 4 years, parents give "beneficial for the child" as the main reason for formal care use. This reason is chosen mostly for those children who attend preschool. We come back to the treatment of preschool in Section 3. To conclude this section, we provide a brief description of the policies related to childcare in place at the time of the survey in 1996. (More details on childcare policies and more generally on the Australian tax and transfer system are available from the authors.) Several types of subsidies were available for childcare. Direct funding was provided to help build, equip and operate childcare centres. This was meant to ensure a sufficient number of childcare places. In addition, two kinds of subsidies were available to households. These depended on the family's income, assets, employment status, number of children and childcare expenses. Childcare assistance was means-tested and paid directly to the providers. This reduced the fees paid by eligible families. The childcare rebate was not means-tested and paid to the parents upon receipt of claims for childcare expenses. The rebate could be claimed for work-related expenses only including training and looking for work.
The survey data do not provide direct information on the amount of subsidy received.
Furthermore, the cost figures provided by respondents are likely to reflect the payment of childcare assistance since this is paid directly to the providers and the survey question does not specify clearly whether gross or net costs should be given.
Thus variations in the hourly cost will measure variations in the payment of government subsidies as well as the distribution of fees charged by the care providers.
Estimation of Demands for Childcare

The use of external information on fees
In order to have some measure of exogenous variations in prices faced by households for childcare services, we use information on fees charged by the service providers and collected by the Department of Family and Community Services through its schemes, and outside school hours care services). A weighted average fee across types of services is computed from the Census data using the number of children in the particular type of care to construct weights to be applied to the providers. All fees are converted to hourly rates using information provided by the Department of Family and Community Services. The resulting fees by state and age of child are presented in Table 4 . A comparison with the hourly costs of childcare observed in the data (see Table 2) shows that fees are on average a little higher than the paid hourly costs especially for children under school age. This could be due to the Child Care Assistance, which creates a wedge between fees charged by the services and the costs paid by the households. It is interesting that the fees charged by providers fall when older children are concerned while the average price of formal care reported by household increases with the age of the youngest child. This could be due to the much lower Childcare
Assistance available for school-aged children.
The treatment of preschool in the model
The use of fees charged by providers of childcare services raises issues of how to treat preschool and how to define formal versus informal care. In the previous sections of the paper, when presenting statistics on formal and informal care we took the usual definition of formal care used in the literature. This definition also corresponds to that used in the CCS and includes preschools. However, preschools are not considered childcare service providers from the point of view of the Department of Family and Community Services and instead form part of the formal education system. The fees presented in Table 4 do not include fees charged by preschools. These latter fees are usually lower. From the CCS, we find an average hourly cost of $1.77 per child for preschool compared to $2.50 per hour for other formal childcare for 3 to 5 years old.
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There are other issues involving the treatment of preschool. Hours of preschool are more or less fixed and once the decision to use preschool has been made, the observed hours may not reflect demanded hours. Furthermore, the main reason given for preschool usage is that it is beneficial to the child (see Section 2). In many ways, preschool can be regarded more as education than childcare although it is not compulsory. From a modelling standpoint, this suggests that preschool should be treated separately from both formal and informal care and possibly represented as a discrete choice (i.e. use versus no use). Given the relatively small sample of households who use preschool, the use of a trivariate model of childcare is not practical here. However, we estimate various specifications for preschool to check on the sensitivity of the main results.
Specification of the demand for childcare model
The framework used for the estimation of the system of demands for formal and informal care is a bivariate Tobit. The model takes into account the correlation between unobservables affecting formal and informal demands. In particular, proximity to family members, an unobservable characteristic, could increase the use of informal care and simultaneously reduce the hours of formal care demanded by reducing the cost of informal care relative to that of formal care. In this case a negative correlation between error terms would be generated by the missing information.
As for the usual Tobit regression, the bivariate Tobit is restrictive in that it forces the coefficients on the explanatory variables to be the same in determining the choice between using zero or positive hours of care as the choice of the particular number of hours of care (if positive). A selection-type model was also estimated but this model was not well-behaved and convergence was only achieved when the errors in the selection and on hours were forced to have perfect correlation of 1.0. This is not surprising given the lack of an instrument to help identify the choice of entering the childcare market separately from the choice of hours of care. We began with specifications that included many interactions and nonlinearities and tested down. In the specification presented in Appendix Table A1 , fees are interacted with indicator dummies for the presence of children in three age groups. Fees multiplied by the number of children in the household in the age groups 0 to 2 and 3 to 4 are included as well. (Note that this specification implies that a fee for a particular age group only matters for the household if there are children in that age group in the household.) Interactions of childcare fees with household income and in particular with income groupings corresponding to policy parameters were insignificant. Labour supply levels enter nonlinearly with jumps at zero and quadratic effects for positive hours of work. Also, employment indicators and hours of work are interacted with the number of children by age group. The parents' ages matter for informal childcare but not for formal childcare. Finally, the results presented in Appendix Table A1 correspond to a model in which preschool hours are included in informal rather than formal care. (See the end of the section for more discussion on the treatment of preschool.)
Various measures of fit are provided in Appendix Table A1 . Overall the models perform well in the sense that they explain over 50% of the variation in formal care demands and 20 to 34% for informal care. Also, the average predicted probability of zero hours is within 1 percentage point of the observed frequency for formal demands and within 8 percentage points for informal demands. In general the models explain formal demands much better than informal care. This is not surprising given the lack of information on the availability of informal care.
Appendix Table A2 presents the average predicted and observed demand for childcare in households based on the employment status of the parents. There is a slight overprediction of demands: 12.83 versus 11.47 for couples and 21.22 versus 18.30 for lone parents. The overprediction is greater among households with working parents.
Although employment is treated in a flexible manner in the model, some aspects of the relationship are not fully captured.
We now turn to the parameter estimates. For both couples and lone parents we find that formal and informal care demands are substitutes in the sense that unobservables that tend to increase one form of use also tend to reduce the other. Maximum likelihood estimates of the correlation coefficients for the error terms are -0.17 for lone parents and -0.27 for couples. Although the correlation is not very strong it is significantly different from zero for both groups of households. (P-values are 0.001 and 0.000 respectively.) The negative correlation could reflect the impact of unobserved characteristics such as availability of informal care or the range of quality offered in the formal care services as captured by the error terms.
Marginal effects
To facilitate the discussion of the results of the bivariate demand model, we compute and present marginal effects of all explanatory variables in Table 5 . For continuous variables (hours of work, income, fees, number of children) these are the derivatives of the predicted dependent variable (the expected hours of childcare including the probability of zero hours) with respect to the variable in question. For indicator variables, they are the differences in the expected hours of childcare with the indicators set alternatively at one and zero. In all cases, the marginal effects are computed at each data point and averaged over the sample. Standard errors are computed on these averages with a bootstrap estimator using 200 replications.
The results presented in Table 5 seem reasonable and generally are in line with expectations. Families with more children use more childcare and so do higher income groups and families with working parents. Additional children of preschool age increase the use of formal childcare while older children reduce usage of this type of care. For example, an additional child aged 3 to 4 increases formal childcare by over 2 hours per week in two-parent households and by almost 4 hours for lone
parents. An additional child aged 10 or over reduces formal childcare by over two and a half hours per week for both couples and lone parents. Informal childcare is increased by the presence of additional children regardless of their age but effects are generally stronger for younger children. Except for children less than1 year old and those aged 5-9 for formal care and 10 and over for informal care, the effects of adding children on of the demand for childcare are substantial and significant.
Parents' employment generally increases usage of both formal and informal childcare but the effects are stronger for informal care, and for lone parent households. The only exception to this is the effect of hours of work by fathers in two-parent households.
Increasing the hours of work for these fathers reduces formal childcare usage by a small amount (.06 hours per week for an increase of one hour of work). The mother's employment status has greater effect on childcare use than that of the father for two parent households. Couples in which the mother works use around 4 additional hours of formal care and 6.5 hours of informal care per week. An employed lone mother uses 3 additional hours of formal childcare and 17.5 additional hours of informal care Notes: Marginal effects are computed for each data point and averaged over the samples. Standard errors are computed on these averages with a bootstrap estimator using 200 replications. Income is measured in dollars per week. Hours of work are measured in hours per week and marginal effects are averaged over the samples of workers only. Employment refers to the labour force status during the reference week.
The counterfactuals for the change in employment are as follows: for those observed working, they are given hours of zero and income equal to the average income observed among non-workers when evaluating the expected value for employment set at zero. For non-workers, they are given average hours of work and income observed among workers when evaluating the expected hours of childcare for employment set at one. The averages used for the counterfactuals are computed separately for males and females and for the two types of households. Fees are measured in dollars per hour and marginal effects are averaged over the samples of households with children in the age group under consideration. The parents' age groups are relative to the 35 and over group. For couples, the capital city dummy does not include the ACT (Australian Capital Territory) or Darwin. The ACT&NT dummy is set at one for all observations in the ACT or NT. We must group the Northern Territories (NT) with the ACT because this is how the data are grouped in the SIHC survey. For sole parents, the capital city dummy is also set at one for all ACT and NT observations. compared to a non-working lone mother. Income increases usage of both formal and informal childcare. Note that these income effects are computed keeping labour supply fixed hence they should be interpreted as pure income effects. The results suggest that childcare is a normal good. An increase of $100 per week in the income of a lone parent keeping their labour supply constant would raise the use of childcare by around one hour per week in total, the increase almost evenly distributed between formal and informal care. In comparison, similar increases in the incomes of either mothers or fathers in two-parent households would cause an increase in total care of about one third of an hour. Fees are negatively related to usage of formal care and with one exception are positively related to informal care. This is consistent with the interpretation of formal and informal care as substitute goods. Among couples, the fees for older children are negatively related to informal care although the effect is very small and insignificant.
The size of the coefficients on the fees seems reasonable, but the standard errors are generally large and several of the coefficients are insignificant. This is likely to be due to the lack of variation in our instrument for childcare prices. (Fees only vary with states and particular age groups for children.) Measures of fees that vary with other characteristics of the households would be preferable but these are not available.
Despite the large standard errors, the marginal effects of fees are generally consistent across specifications (see at the end of this section).
Price elasticities of the demand for formal and informal childcare
To facilitate the interpretation of the income, price and hours of work effects, we present these in the form of elasticities in Table 6 . A similar procedure as for the marginal effects is used to derive these results; that is, elasticities are calculated for each data point and averaged over the samples. Standard errors on these averages are computed with a bootstrap estimator using 200 replications. The own price elasticity (the proportional effect of fees on hours of formal care) is negative and quite strong for both types of households. It implies that a 1% increase in childcare fees will cause a reduction in demand for formal care of 0.34 to 0.64% for couples. For lone parents the results are more variable with effects ranging from 0.04 to 3.43%. As for the marginal effects, the standard errors on the average elasticities are relatively large especially for lone parents. Informal care is a substitute in the sense that formal price effects are positive except for the case of older children in couples, where a small insignificant negative elasticity is observed. Again these estimates are fairly imprecise.
Income elasticities are positive in all cases. The effects are stronger for formal than for informal care. For two-parent households, a 1% increase of the mothers' income (at constant labour supply) would result in an increase of 0.20% in formal care usage and no significant change in informal care. A similar increase in the fathers' income would raise both formal and informal care by 0.19%. For lone parents, it would cause an increase of 0.42% in formal care and just over 0.10% in informal care.
Positive and significant effects of hours of work on childcare use are found for mothers. Increasing hours of work among working mothers in two-parent households by 1% would cause an increase of 0.36% in formal care and 0.23% in informal care.
Among working lone mothers, a similar increase in working hours would increase the hours of formal care by almost 1% while also causing a 0.21% increase in informal care. Results for lone fathers' hours of work can also be large, but they are imprecise.
For fathers in couples, an increase of 1% in their hours would lead to a reduction in formal care of around 1 hour per week while having no significant effects on informal care. Note that working hours are already very high for this group and even a small increase leads to a very high level of work.
Predicted demand for childcare
Finally, in Table 7 we present estimates of total weekly demands for childcare (formal and informal) by employment status, income and presence of young children. The household types in Table 7 are chosen to illustrate the separate effects of the presence of young children, hours of work and income on childcare demands.
We begin by looking at the effect of young children in households with working parents assuming the parents work the median number of hours and earn the median Notes: For all characteristics other than labour supply and the presence of children 1 to 5 years old, the average characteristics over the samples are used to predict hours of care. In particular, households are given the average number of children over 5 years old. I refers to income including labour income and H indicates hours of work. The median, low and high values for income and hours are computed from sample information and are specific to the employment profile of the household. Low values correspond to the 25 th percentile while high values are the 75 th percentile. Specific values are given in the table. For couples, when one parent works it is assumed that the father is the worker. In this case the mother is given 57.20 for income and zero hours. These are the median values for that sub-sample. When both parents work, the father is given median hours and income and the mother is given the hours and income listed in the Table. income for the household in question. We find that adding a young child aged 1 to lone-parent households with a working parent increases total childcare demands by 20 hours per week. Note that the parent is assumed to work 20 hours per week in this case. For couples with one worker (the father) there is a modest increase of around 2 hours per week in childcare demand. When both parents work the increase is substantial -8 hours per week-but it is less than for lone parents. (The mother is also assumed to work 20 hours per week in this case.) Adding a second child of preschool age, specifically a child aged 3 to 4, raises hours demanded by a small amount for couples but it doubles the number of hours predicted for lone parents.
Turning now to the effects of hours of work, we find that both for couples and for lone parents, it is hours of work rather than income that is the main determinant of childcare demand. For example in the case of lone parents, raising hours of work from 8 to 37 increases childcare demand by 20 to 25 hours for each preschool child.
Raising income from 350 to 550 per week causes an increase of roughly 3 hours per week per preschool child. (These hours and income levels correspond to the 25 th and 75 th percentiles observed in the subsample of working lone parent households.) A similar result is found for couples. Increasing the mother's hours of work from 8 to 37
raises total demand for care by roughly 10 hours per preschool child while raising income per week from 225 to 550 causes an increase of around one hour per preschool child. For couples with only the father working, both increases in hours of work and income have small impacts only.
Alternative specifications with regard to preschool
In the results presented so far preschool has been included in informal care. The main reason for this is the exclusion of preschool in the fees for formal care. Table 8 provides marginal effects of fees for formal care on the quantity of childcare demanded for three different specifications of the treatment of preschool hours. Other than the treatment of preschool hours, the specifications are the same as presented in Appendix Table A1 . The largest changes in the three specifications concern the effects of fees. The previous discussion on the effects of other characteristics applies to the other two models.
Since preschool affects children aged 3 to 4 only, we expect the impact of excluding preschool hours from formal care to be stronger for that group. The results in Table 8 show that for couples, it is the relationship between fees and demands for the age group 0-2 that is affected. The results suggest that, among couples, hours of preschool are positively correlated with fees charged for formal care of children between 0 and 2 years old. With the inclusion of preschool in formal care, the interpretation of the price effect becomes more problematic and since this is a main policy variable, it is preferable to exclude preschool from formal care. For lone parents, results suggest that preschool fees could be positively related to other fees for formal care for children aged 3-4. Hence an argument for the inclusion of preschool in formal care could be made. However we choose to be consistent with the treatment of preschool in the sample of couples and to include it in the informal care component for all households. Table 5 for a definition of marginal effects and the calculation of standard errors. Other than the treatment of preschool, the specifications are identical in the three models and correspond to the one presented in Appendix respectively. Although the models are not nested and cannot be tested against each other formally, the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) would suggest that the models in which preschool is treated as informal care are preferred. In the following, preschool is grouped in informal care.
4. Childcare Costs and Labour Supply Estimates
The cost of childcare
Since we are combining information from two different data sources, childcare use affects labour supply through the household budget constraint only. Specifically we cannot model the correlation in unobservables between labour supply choices and childcare use. This is the cost of using a more sophisticated model and a richer data set for the analysis of labour supply. From the estimated demands, we need to derive costs of childcare for different types of households at all possible values of labour supply.
One possibility is the use of the system of demands presented in the previous section.
Costs could be estimated by multiplying the predicted demands by hourly fees for the different types of households. Since observed costs for informal care are zero for most households, this would mean essentially using zero costs for that type of care. We choose a different approach. We estimate a model similar to the bivariate Tobit described in Section 3 with informal care costs replacing the hours of informal care
demanded. All explanatory variables in this specification are the same as those used in the joint demand model. Costs of preschool are included in informal costs for the reasons given in the previous section. Although harder to interpret, this model provides a better prediction of informal care costs than would a model based on the demand for informal care given the lack of exogenous prices for informal care and the prevalence of zero self-reported prices.
Overall the fit of this new model and the results are similar to that of the previous framework. The approach provides a reasonable prediction of both formal and informal childcare costs. We compare within sample predictions with observed costs in Appendix Table A2 Panel II. Observed costs for formal care are computed as observed hours of formal care (excluding preschool) multiplied by the average fee for the household. These costs are added to observed informal care costs (including preschool) to form the total given in Table A2 . Predicted costs are computed similarly with the use of predicted formal care demands and predicted informal care costs.
Since we are using the fees charged by providers, the costs should be interpreted as gross costs before childcare rebates and assistance. There remains a slight overprediction on average: $27.05 versus $25.24 for couples and $27.20 versus $25.95 for lone parents. These discrepancies are small given the complexity of the dependent variable and we are satisfied with the performance of the model.
The marginal effects for this model are presented along with standard errors in
Appendix Table A3 . Briefly, there is little change in the results for the formal care demand equation. Some differences are found in the effects on informal costs for lone parent households. In particular, employment of the lone parent causes a much smaller effect on informal costs than on the informal hours demanded which suggests the availability of care at a zero price. Also, an increase in formal care fees is likely to cause a reduction in informal care costs despite a positive effect on hours used, again suggesting the increase is in informal hours at zero prices. Finally, the effects of the age of the parents are different for both types of households. When looking at hours of informal care demanded, we found that younger parents had larger demands for informal care hours. We interpreted this as a measure of the availability of care by grandparents. The effect of the parents' age on costs is more likely to be negative possibly also an indication that the increase in informal hours is often at zero cost
The imputation of childcare costs
The predicted gross costs are used to impute childcare costs for households in the SIHC sample for different labour supply choices. First, for each labour supply choice, a gross income level (including all transfers and taxes) is computed within the MITTS model. Then, for each household with children of 12 years or younger in the Survey of Income and Housing Costs 1996/1997 (SIHC) a predicted cost of childcare is imputed based on the characteristics of the household (state, urban, number and age of children, couples versus lone parents, calculated gross income). This childcare cost is generated for each possible labour supply choice allowed in the model.
Since we combine information from two surveys based on the characteristics of the households, we need to verify that the samples of households are similar overall.
Appendix Table A4 shows the weighted and unweighted distributions of the main variables used in modelling childcare demands for the CCS and the SIHC. For a more detailed description of the data from the SIHC the reader is referred to ABS (1997, undated) . We find that the samples are similar in the age and number of children, 9 the distribution by age of the parents, geographical location, and the level of participation in the labour market. The largest differences are found in the distribution of hours of work. There is a smaller proportion of full-time workers in the CCS than in the SIHC.
This difference remains even after weighting to represent the population distribution.
For mothers (fathers) in couples the respective proportions are 16.8 (72.6) compared to18.8 (81.5) while for lone parents the figures are 13.5 compared to 19.6.
We believe the discrepancy in the distribution of hours is mainly due to the treatment of the self-employed. In the CCS we cannot adequately identify the self-employed while in the Survey of Housing and Income Costs self-employed workers are not given hours of work hence we have to exclude this group in the labour supply estimation. The proportion of self-employed workers in the SIHC is approximately 7.5 % for women and 14 % for men in two-parent households and 4 % for lone parents. If self-employed parents with young children are more likely to work part time than salaried workers, their exclusion from the SIHC sample would result in greater hours of work on average for households with young children.
Net costs are calculated from the predicted gross costs of childcare and the predicted levels of Childcare Assistance and Rebate. These are calculated within MITTS based on the characteristics of the households and the predicted formal childcare costs. The subsidies are deducted from the formal costs, before adding the formal and informal costs together. 10 The result is a predicted net childcare cost based on predicted formal demands, average fees per household, total predicted informal care costs and calculated subsidies.
The labour supply model
Rather than associating to each household the predicted childcare cost, we use a simulation technique to improve the efficiency of the model. This consists of predicting childcare costs including an error term drawn from a distribution with 9 Children aged 12 cannot be separated from children aged between 9 and 11 years in the SIHC. Hence the proportion of households with children over 9 is slightly larger in this survey than in the CCS. 10 It is assumed that all people paying for formal childcare are eligible for the rebate (that is they are either working or in training or searching for a job). This will understate the childcare cost to some extent, although given the statistics on reasons for childcare presented previously, we expect that most families with children in formal childcare (which excludes preschool) use this type of care for employment or education reasons. characteristics equal to those estimated as part of the cost model, so we draw from the distribution of childcare costs. Repeated draws are taken for each household and the likelihood function is averaged over these draws before being maximized. In the prediction stage, optimal labour supply is predicted for each draw and an average is taken over the draws. Technically, this involves averaging the labour supply estimates rather than the childcare costs estimates. This method provides a more efficient prediction of the childcare costs since it incorporates the variation in unobservables affecting costs based on the estimated variance of these unobservables. A further advantage is that the calculation of Childcare Assistance and Childcare Rebate is more accurate in this approach, given that the subsidy payable for the average A discrete choice model is specified (similar to Van Soest, 1995; Keane and Moffitt, 1998) . Married women and sole parents choose between 11 labour supply levels while married men choose among 6 points. The utility function is specified as a quadratic in leisure and net income. An error term with an extreme value distribution is added to the utility. The parameters of the utility function depend on individual and household characteristics and on random terms capturing unobserved heterogeneity and are assumed to be normally distributed. Parameters representing fixed costs of working are included in the utility when positive labour choices are made. Finally, the model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.
The results of the labour supply estimation including the childcare costs are given in the last two columns of Appendix Tables A5 and A6. These tables include Table 9 presents the overall labour supply values for those households in the SIHC with children. These are based on the new parameter estimates, which take into account the childcare costs estimated from the formal demand/informal costs model. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results we look at labour supply responses following two types of changes in childcare costs. First, we look at the changes in expected labour supply resulting from a 10% increase in net costs of childcare. This increases the costs directly and incorporates any changes in the demands. The second experiment increases the price of formal childcare by 10%. Demands adjust downward resulting in a smaller increase in total gross costs. The government subsidies are recomputed after the cut in price to calculate the net costs. Table 9 presents the simulated elasticity measures averaged over all households in the sample. The increased costs of childcare reduce participation and hours of work by a modest amount. The effects are larger for lone parents than partnered women. The impacts on fathers in two adult households are negligible. Also as expected, an increase in costs generates a larger effect than a rise in the price due to adjustments in demands. For lone parents, the elasticity in hours of work is -0.15 with respect to costs and -0.05 with respect to prices. For partnered women, the figures are -0.03 and -0.02 respectively. The labour supply effects not only vary with the number of adults in the households but also with income levels and the age of children. Table 10 illustrates these results.
Elasticity of labour supply to childcare fees and costs
Lone parents, particularly those with preschool children, are most affected. For these households, the elasticity in hours of work to a change in the price of childcare is -0.18. When restricting the sample to those earning less than the median wage, the effect increases to -0.22. Labour supply decreases substantially when preschool children are present (5.71 versus 11.35 hours per week). The effect is larger for those facing wages below the median wage for the group (3.70 hours per week.) It is interesting to note that an increase in the fee has a greater impact on sole parents with preschool children earning low wages than an increase in net costs. At the original fee, they already receive close to the maximum amount of rebate and assistance so that the increase in the fee causes an even relatively larger increase in the net cost; the lower demand for childcare is not sufficient to counteract this completely.
For partnered women, the effect of a 1% price increase on hours increases from -0.02% to -0.05% when preschool children are present. As for lone parents, the labour supply of partnered women is substantially affected by the presence of young children (hours per week decline from 14.52 to 10.56.) Women with young children and facing low wages work less especially if their partner is a high-wage worker (6.88 hours per week.) Note a: For (2), the difference between (2) and (1) and for (3) the difference between (3) and (1) is taken. b: For all households, the median wage levels used are the following: for lone parents $9.68, for husbands $16.29 and for wives $11.55. For households with children less than 5 years old, the median wage levels used are: for lone parents $9.61, for husbands $15.79, and for wives $11.23.
Males in two-parent households are hardly affected by childcare fee increases. Men's labour supply is also practically unchanged by the presence of preschool children (on average 38.18 hours per week for men with preschool children, versus the sample average of 38.24). The wage level however is important for this group's labour supply (on average 34.36 hours per week for men on less than median wages, versus 38.24 hours).
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Comparison with Other Studies
Studies in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Norway have looked at the impact of childcare costs and/or childcare prices on the probability of employment and the average number of hours worked. Table 11 presents an overview of these results presented in the form of elasticities. The last few rows present our results with regard to the net childcare cost and the gross childcare price. We include both since most other studies report the elasticity with regard to the childcare cost. Australia are closer to those found for the U.K. In our study we consistently find much higher elasticities for lone parents and more generally for low-income households. This has also been found for the U.S. in Michalopoulos et al. (1992) . The simulation in the latter study examines the effect of introducing a policy that increases childcare subsidies for low-income households. They do not present elasticities but the simulations show that childcare subsidies aimed at the lower income groups are more effective at stimulating labour supply than subsidies benefiting households on higher incomes. The review paper by Anderson and Levine (1999) also mentions results that suggest that poorer households are more affected by changes in childcare cost changes.
Blundell et al. (2000) is one of the few studies to look at married men. Their results (not shown in Table 11 ) suggest that men are hardly affected at all by childcare costs.
This is similar to our findings.
There are also interesting differences in the Australian results and other overseas studies. For example, Ribar (1995) finds that in the U.S. the childcare cost elasticity is lower for women with children under 6 years of age while we consistently find the impacts on labour supply to be greater in households with preschool children. Many factors are likely to be involved in explaining the similarities and the differences between Australia and other countries such as the size of the costs relative to earnings, the prevalence of part-time work, and the availability of care. A careful study comparing these factors would be very helpful in understanding the relationship between labour supply and childcare but it is clearly beyond the scope of the present study.
Conclusion
The first stage in the empirical work conducted in this paper is the estimation of joint demands for formal and informal childcare conditional on the observed labour supply of the household. Information from the Child Care Survey (CCS) conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 1996 is used. The sample is representative of the population of Australian families with children and includes employed and non-employed parents. We use data on fees charged by childcare centres to capture exogenous variations in prices in the market for childcare services. Lone parent and two-parent households are analysed separately.
Our findings suggest that nonparental childcare costs in Australia are low on average, mostly because a significant amount of the care is informal with zero monetary cost.
The costs vary substantially across households depending on the presence of preschool children and on the labour supply of the parents. In particular, the weekly costs are much higher for lone parents than for couples. The results for the demand functions show a substantial and negative price elasticity for formal care. (1995) and Duncan and MacCrae (1999) and estimated by simulated maximum likelihood methods. The budget constraint incorporates all main features of the tax and transfer system in place at the time of the surveys.
11 The impacts of childcare price and cost increases on household labour supply are simulated using the model estimates. A 10% increase in the price of childcare reduces the participation rate by around 0.5% for sole parents and 0.2% for married women.
The smaller effect for married women relative to lone parents is consistent across various specifications. Effects on the labour supply of married men are negligible. A comparison of our results with overseas findings shows that the sign of the effects are similar but the quantitative results for women and lone parents are in the low end of the range. Specifically, the Australian labour supply elasticities relative to childcare costs are more similar to those found in the U.K. than the U.S. estimates.
For certain subgroups in the population, the responses in labour supply to increases in childcare costs or fees are substantially larger. For sole parents, the average effect of an increase of 10% in the price of childcare is a fall of 0.5% in expected hours of work. This labour supply reaction is close to -1.8% for those with preschool children and -2.2% for those with preschool children and earning low wages. The effect for married women is smaller than for lone parents at an average of -0.2%. A larger effect of -0.5% is found for married women with preschool children. There are conflicting results from overseas studies on the relative impact of childcare costs on the labour supply of households with and without preschool children. However the findings from studies designed to isolate the effects on low-income families tend to support our results on the larger effect for low-wage women.
Appendix Notes: The sample size for couples is 4908 and for lone parents 1079. For couples, an employment dummy is interacted with the number of children only if both parents are employed; in this case, the hours interacted with the number of children are those for the parent with the smallest hours of work. For couples the urban dummy does not include ACT-NT areas while for lone parents the urban dummy variable is set at one for all observations in the ACT -NT areas. The observed mean of the dependent variable is computed over all observations used in the regression including the censored ones. The expected value takes into account the probability of censoring and is averaged over all observations used in the regression. The observed proportion at 0 is the proportion of observations censored at 0 while the predicted proportion is the predicted probability of a censored value at 0 averaged over all observations used in the regression. The correlation between predicted and observed is computed over all non-zero observations. The p-value corresponds to the χ Appendix Notes: Marginal effects are computed for each data point and averaged over the samples. The predicted costs for formal care are computed as the predicted demand times the average hourly fee for the household based on the number and age of the children and the state of residence. Predicted informal costs are computed in the usual manner based on the estimation results. Predicted informal and formal costs are added to yield predicted total childcare costs. Standard errors are computed on these averages with a bootstrap estimator using 200 replications. Income is measured in dollars per week. Hours of work are measured in hours per week and marginal effects are averaged over the samples of workers only. Employment refers to the labour force status during the reference week. The counterfactuals for the change in employment are as follows: for those observed working, they are given hours of zero and income equal to the average income observed among non-workers when evaluating the expected value for employment set at zero. For non-workers, they are given average hours of work and income observed among workers when evaluating the expected hours of childcare for employment set at one. The averages used for the counterfactuals are computed separately for males and females and for the two types of households. Fees are measured in dollars per hour and marginal effects are averaged over the samples of households with children in the age group under consideration. The parents' age groups are relative to the 35 and over group. For couples, the capital city dummy does not include the ACT or Darwin. The ACT&NT dummy is set at one for all observations in the ACT or NT. We must group the Northern Territories with the ACT because this is how the data are grouped in the IDS survey. For sole parents, the capital city dummy is also set at one for all ACT and NT observations. Note: The sample sizes are: for couples, 1281 in the SIHC and 5305 in the CCS, for lone parents, 353 in the SIHC and 1116 in the CCS. a) This includes children 10 to 12 in the SIHC and 10 to 11 in the CC. b) The sample of workers is limited to paid employees in the SIHC since hours of work are not provided for those working on their own account. The sample of workers in the CCS includes all workers as we cannot separate the employees. The proportion of self-employed workers in the SIHC is approximately 7.5 % for women and 14 % for men in two-parent households and 4 % for lone parents. Appendix Table A5 Labour supply estimates for couples using 10 draws from childcare costs and prices respectively (2662 observations) a Six discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each man: 0 hours for non-participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 2.5 to 15 hours, 20 hours for people working from 15 to 25 hours, 30 hours for people working from 25 to 35 hours, 40 hours for people working from 35 to 45 hours, and 50 hours for people working more than 45 hours. Eleven discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each woman: 0 hours for non-participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for people working from 2.5 to 7.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 hours for people working from 12.5 to 17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. b The unobserved heterogeneity terms were found to be insignificant and are left out of these specifications.
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Appendix Table A6 Labour supply estimates for lone parents using 10 draws from childcare costs and prices respectively (456 observations) and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for people working from 2.5 to 7.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 hours for people working from 12.5 to 17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. b The unobserved heterogeneity terms were found to be insignificant and are left out of these specifications.
